How Federal Regulators,
Lenders, and
Wall Street Created America’s Housing Crisis
Nine Proposals for
a Long-Term Recovery
Executive Summary:
For many Americans, the dream of home ownership is turning
into a nightmare.
Despite the absence
of an economic recession, delinquencies are surging, home sales are falling,
prices are declining, and foreclosure rates are rising to multi-year highs.
All told, up to 2.4 million could lose their homes, while investors may
lose as much as $110 billion.
The impacts of the housing slump on home financing
are serious: Delinquency rates on all forms of mortgages have climbed
sharply. Some 96 higher-risk lenders have succumbed to rising loan losses,
early payment defaults, funding cutoffs and related financial difficulties.
At the same time, delinquencies and charge-offs may be spilling over into
the commercial real estate lending sector.
As a result, some large banks and thrifts may be at
risk. And overall, it appears the mortgage crisis may not be limited
to niche players that specialized in low-quality loans.
How did the housing and mortgage crisis reach this extreme?
Rather than acting as a moderating force, the Federal
Reserve often played an important role in further inflating the housing
bubble.
In the early 2000s, the Fed drove real interest rates
into negative territory, erasing the real returns on a wide variety of savings
instruments relied upon for income by millions of Americans and encouraging
them to shift resources to real estate speculation. At the same time, it
drove down the real cost of borrowing and encouraged imprudent risk-taking.
The Fed replaced one bubble, mostly confined to the technology
sector, with another, far larger bubble, encompassing most of the housing
market. And consequently, homes became unaffordable to most Americans, as
the housing affordability index compiled by the National Association of Realtors
dropped to its lowest level on record.
By 2004, it was nearly impossible to ignore that the housing
market was overheating, as home prices rose at the fastest rates in decades
and by more than four-and-a-half times as quickly as inflation. Yet the Federal
Reserve did not believe it should play a forceful role in stemming this mania
via monetary policy.
Although setting monetary policy is a complex process,
we believe that, in the face of a potentially dangerous speculative mania
in housing, policymakers at the Federal Reserve failed to recognize the evidence,
failed to send clear signals to market participants, and failed to lean against
the inflating asset bubble.
Most of the private marketplace players also failed
to take protective steps. Rather than maintain prudent lending standards
and accept a decline in loan volume, they debased lending standards and
accepted the risk of serious long-term damage to their finances, to the
industry, and, ultimately, to the economy.
The securitization boom, aided by excess liquidity,
significantly boosted risk-taking and greatly inflated the housing bubble.
As of year-end 2006, there were $6.5 trillion worth of
securitized loans outstanding, compared to $4.3 trillion in U.S. Treasuries.
The issuance of mortgage-backed securities surged to $2.4 trillion in 2006
from $738 billion in 2000, more than a three-fold increase.
This aggravated the boom and bust in several ways: Securitization
removed, minimized, or postponed the consequences of poor lending decisions from those
making those decisions. It stressed quantity over quality.
It made it more profitable and easier for lenders and brokers to lead borrowers
to inappropriate loan products. And it resulted in distorted market price
signals regarding the risks inherent in the subprime mortgage market. Several
investment funds have suffered severe financial difficulties in 2007.
Nine Proposals for a Long-Term Recovery
With the goal of avoiding quick fixes and fostering a
healthy, long-term recovery, we offer the following proposals to federal
regulators and legislators:
1. Better
monitoring and prompter action by the Federal Reserve to help avert
run-away asset price inflation.
2. Better
enforcement of existing predatory lending statutes.
3. Better
protection of borrowers through a model akin to one recently established
between the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and three subsidiaries of
American International Group.
4. Greater
focus by regulators on banks and thrifts whose mortgage performance measures
are showing the most stress.
5. Suitability
requirements for the mortgage lending industry.
6. Restrict,
but do not ban, specific lending practices.
7. Federal
training, education, licensing, and testing standards for mortgage lenders.
8. Assignee
liability for secondary market buyers of home loans should be seriously considered.
9. More
focus on developing programs that promote saving for a down payment.
These solutions cannot be painless. But in order to pave
the way for a sounder future, many of the sacrifices that were avoided in
the past may have to be made in the present.
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